This international history of the origins and nature of 'cold war' offers the first systematic examination of the complex relationship between the United States and Italy, and of American debates about warfare in the years between World War II and the Korean War. Kaeten Mistry reveals how the defeat of the Marxist left in the 1948 Italian election was perceived as a victory for the United States amidst a 'war short of war', as defined by influential planner George Kennan, becoming an allegory for cold war in American minds. The book analyses how political warfare sought to employ covert operations, overt tactics, and propaganda in a co-ordinated offensive against international communism. Charting the critical contribution of a broad network of local, religious, civic, labour, and business groups, Mistry reveals how the notion of a specific American success paved the way for a problematic future for US-Italian relations and American political warfare.
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This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. 'Writing a book is a very lonely business', the author Mario Vargas Llosa commented; 'You are totally cut off from the rest of the world, submerged in your obsessions and memories.' While this is undoubtedly true, fortunately, one is never entirely alone thanks to colleagues, friends, and family, and it is my pleasure to be able to properly acknowledge them here. Their support and encouragement helped sustain me and played no small part in the completion of this book.
The project began as a doctoral thesis and my first intellectual and personal thanks are to Scott Lucas for guiding the work, for his inspiration and tremendous faith in a young student interested in American foreign policy. During this time Mario Del Pero quickly became a de facto supervisor and loyal friend. Mario has been a model scholar in every respect and I greatly appreciate his support, advice, and camaraderie over the years. Federico Romero was an exemplary examiner, offering constructive criticism and generous praise, and read subsequent drafts as the thesis developed into a book. I also owe a huge intellectual debt to Anders Stephanson for stimulating conversation, insight, and nurturing my naïve fascination with George Kennan. Bevan Sewell has been a faithful comrade, reading umpteen drafts and providing unflagging encouragement to make a meaningful contribution. The book has been greatly improved thanks to these individuals. Any errors are, of course, mine alone.
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